QAISS is building a neutral quantum-AI coordination layer. Follow the public roadmap and verify every claim.

Quantum readiness

Prepared, not panicked.

Quantum computers that can break today’s signatures do not exist yet, but migration takes years. This page explains plainly what is at risk, what Solana has published, and what you can do now.

Education · read-onlyThe QAISS token is not quantum-safe

The threat model

What breaks, and what only bends

Shor’s algorithm breaks public-key cryptography based on factoring and elliptic curves. Grover’s algorithm only speeds up brute-force search. Both need large, error-corrected machines that no one has built yet.

AlgorithmUsed forQuantum attackImpact
Ed25519 / ECDSA signaturesSolana, Bitcoin and Ethereum accountsShor’s algorithmBroken: a large enough fault-tolerant quantum computer could derive the private key from the public key.
RSA, Diffie–HellmanTLS, older PKIShor’s algorithmBroken in the same way.
SHA-256 and other hashesAddresses, Merkle trees, Passport hashesGrover’s algorithmWeakened, not broken: about a square-root speed-up, so 256-bit hashes keep roughly 128-bit security.
AES-256Encryption at restGrover’s algorithmWeakened, not broken: still considered secure.

Solana

Every address is a public key

A Solana address is an Ed25519 public key. On Bitcoin, an unused address is a hash, which hides its key; Solana has no such layer. So every account that has ever held funds has its public key on-chain.

PUBLISHED PLAN

Anza and Firedancer chose Falcon and have early implementations. Solana describes a phased path: research first; then post-quantum keys for new wallets if the threat becomes credible; then migration of existing wallets. Its 27 April 2026 post says no change is required today.

RISK ESTIMATE

Anza puts the chance of a quantum computer able to break this at about 3–5% within five years. It has prototyped a migration that keeps an account’s address. It also notes that vaults cannot protect the wider account model.

EXPERIMENTS

The Winternitz Vault uses one-time hash-based signatures. It holds native SOL only, is spent once, and is unaudited. It is a research tool, not a place for SPL tokens such as QAISS.

Check an address

What does my address reveal?

Paste any Solana address. This runs only in your browser: nothing is sent anywhere, and no wallet is connected.

    Standards

    NIST post-quantum cryptography

    FIPS 203

    ML-KEM

    Key encapsulation (from CRYSTALS-Kyber)

    Final standard, August 2024

    FIPS 204

    ML-DSA

    Lattice signatures (from CRYSTALS-Dilithium)

    Final standard, August 2024

    FIPS 205

    SLH-DSA

    Hash-based signatures (from SPHINCS+)

    Final standard, August 2024

    FN-DSA

    Falcon

    Compact lattice signatures; the scheme Solana’s client teams chose

    Being standardised by NIST

    What to do

    Practical steps today

    1. Nothing urgent. No quantum computer can break Ed25519 today. Watch for official migration tooling from Solana and your wallet provider.
    2. Distrust “quantum-proof” offers. Regulators have warned about “Quantum AI” trading scams. No token, including QAISS, is quantum-safe today.
    3. Learn the vocabulary. Shor, Grover, ML-KEM and Falcon are in the Learning Hub. You can try Grover’s search and the QFT behind Shor’s algorithm in the Lab.
    4. Keep evidence verifiable. QAISS Passport hashes use SHA-256, which keeps about 128-bit security even against Grover.

    Release notes

    Engineering updates,
    not hype.

    Research drafts, releases, and every change to a public claim. No price talk.

    Subscriptions open once the project publishes its privacy policy and mailing endpoint.