Research track · Security
Post-quantum security awareness & migration
Plan cryptographic migration — the “security” in QAISS.
Why this horizon. Post-quantum migration runs on classical computers and is needed before a large quantum computer exists, because data recorded today can be decrypted later.
- The problem
- Organizations lack inventories of where vulnerable public-key cryptography is used.
- Why quantum or hybrid methods may be relevant
- Standardized post-quantum algorithms now exist; migration takes years.
- Classical baseline
- Existing crypto-inventory tools and published migration guidance.
- What QAISS could provide
- Education, inventory templates, threat-modeling guides, and migration checklists.
- What evidence would count as success
- Adopters complete a documented inventory and migration plan.
- Limitations & open questions
- QAISS does not claim the token or platform is “quantum-secure”. No formal security design has been reviewed yet.
- Current status
- Planned No experiments have been published for this track yet.
Workflow on QAISS
From question to checkable result.
- STEP 1
Inventory where RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography are used.
- STEP 2
Rank systems by how long their data must stay secret (Mosca’s inequality).
- STEP 3
Plan migration to standardised algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA).
- STEP 4
Test hybrid deployments; keep crypto-agility for future changes.
Interactive · runs in your browser
Is your data already at risk?
Nobody knows z. Published resource estimates for breaking RSA-2048 have fallen from about 20 million noisy qubits (2019) to under a million (2025), while today’s largest machines are far smaller. Pick z yourself; the point is that x and y are often longer than people assume. This tool stores and sends nothing.
Sources
Read the literature.
- Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computerP. W. Shor · SIAM J. Comput. 26, 1484 · 1997
- How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubitsC. Gidney, M. Ekerå · Quantum 5, 433 · 2021
- How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubitsC. Gidney · arXiv:2505.15917 · 2025
- Cybersecurity in an era with quantum computers: will we be ready?M. Mosca · IEEE Security & Privacy 16(5), 38–41 · 2018
- FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism StandardNIST · Federal Information Processing Standards · 2024
Cited for context. QAISS is not affiliated with the authors or publishers.
No quantum advantage, production savings, medical benefit, financial return, or security guarantee is claimed for this track.